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"How few would believe that from sources purely imaginary such happiness could be 
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ABSTRACT 
This study was designed to determine parental attitudes and conceptualisations of the 
function of imaginary companions. Fourteen parents with children who have 
imaginary companions and sixteen parents whose children do not have imaginary 
companions, were given one of two questionnaires to complete. The posted 
questionnaires differed only in regard to those questions directly related to personal 
experience. Parents in both groups described their children similarly in regard to 
family composition, competency levels, social activities and behaviour problems. 
Parents of children with imaginary companions indicated that not all companion's play 
the same role or function in their creators life. Parental attitudes toward imaginary 
companions were predominantly negative regardless of whether their child had had an 
imaginary companion. Attitudes varied in regard to, the age of the child, the length of 
time they had the companion, the perceived depth of fantasy and the function that the 
companion served. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
Between the ages of 2 112 and 9 many children engage in long-term interaction with 
one or more fictional creatures - imagiruu:y companions. Imaginary companions have 
two defining characteristics. Firstly they exist only in the mind of their creator; 
secondly they can be distinguished from simple imaginative play in regard to their 
temporal and spatial qualities, which restrict imaginary companions to those that last 
across time and in more than one place. 
Despite existing only in the imagination of their creators imaginary companions do 
have a basis in reality. It was Aristotle who first observed that there is nothing in the 
intellect that was not first in the senses, and so it is with the imagination. That is, we 
draw on our previous experiences to create the images that constitute the imagination 
and consequently imaginary companions. Heinz Herska, a Swiss anthropologist, 
applies this perspective to children's play, stating that in play children's real experiences 
become the stimulants for what he calls the imaginative consciousness. Herska 
explains that "the dialogical Wlion of both forms of consciousness prevents imaginative 
consciousness from being severed from reality" (cited Singer & Singer, 1992, p. 209). 
The premise that imaginative behaviour is routed in reality is illustrated by anecdotal 
information that demonstrates that children often draw their inspiration for their 
imaginary companions from television or story characters or indeed real people. For 
example Newson and Newson (1976) tell of a boy whose imaginary companion is 
''just like Peter Pan". This work is written from this perspective, at the same time 
however it is understood that others view this differently and consequently their 
attitudes are effected. 
Hilgard (1977) concurs with Herska's view stating that the substance of the 
imagination is made up "of fragments from the past no matter how bizarre the 
combinations or distortions" (p.100). However, Hilgard goes on to make the 
comparison between the imagination and hallucinations, such a comparison may 
contribute to the negativity often ascribed to imaginary companions, rather than 
illustrating their normality. 
Imaginativeness, especially that which does not physically aid in the production of 
something, such as having an imaginary companion, is viewed by much of society as 
undesirable. Much of society, unlike Herska and Hilgard, views imaginative behaviour 
as representing a shift away from reality. This view has been expressed clearly in the 
past by such respected theorists as Maria Montessori. Montessori believed that fantasy 
had no basis in reality and as such only succeeded in divorcing the mind "from its 
normal function of developing the intellect" (cited Standing, 1984; p. 261). 
Modem theorists have altered their view of imaginativeness, seeing it as a vital 
ingredient in healthy development, but whether this change has been reflected in public 
opinion has yet to be seen. Pearse (1992) puts great emphasis on the significance of 
the imagination in the development of the child, stating that "nature has not 
programmed error into the genetic system and that the child's preoccupation with 
fantasy and imagination is vital to development" (p. 117). Woolley and Phelps (1994) 
take an interesting view of children's imaginativeness, arguing that holding "magical 
beliefs" is not unique to childhood. They maintain that the traditional view that 
children become more rational and less credulous with age can be countered by the 
view that "children and adults both engage in seemingly magical thinking; the degree to 
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which they do so depends on the domain, and in part on their perception of the costs 
and benefits of doing so in the particular situation in which they find themselves" 
(1994, p. 65). Such a view is perhaps a good way to normalise having an imaginary 
companion. 
Beyond the obvious function of a playmate, there are, it appears, other reasons for a 
child to create an imaginary companion. Such reasons or functions may shed some 
light on the question of whether imaginary companions are positive or negative 
additions to children's lives. From the literature there emerge three general 
classifications into which theories pertaining to why children create imaginary 
companions fit, these are psychoanalytic, ecological and developmental. Each is 
similar in that they view imaginary companions as fulfilling a need or function, 
however, they differ either by the way in which they fulfil that function or by what that 
function or need is. 
The most widely offered explanation of why children have imaginary companions is 
that which states that imaginary companions aid the development of self-consciousness 
in the young child. 1bis view originated from psychoanalytic theory, and in recent 
years has had little attention from the main theorists in this area. The egocentric child 
that relentlessly looks for the fulfilment of his or her most basic needs eventually 
according to Erikson (1963), must weather the crisis of "autonomy versus shame and 
doubt". The result of the child's successful solution of this crisis is the ability to 
distinguish between "I" and "you" - that is the first step toward self-consciousness. 
Similarly Piaget (1957) explains that once a child achieves the intellectual level of 
concrete operations it is possible to ascribe "equivalent personal value" to others, thus 
moving away from the egocentric social interactions of the preoperational phase. 
According to Erikson and Piaget, then, the young child is capable of, from a 
psychological and intellectual perspective, distinguishing between themselves and 
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others. The way in which the child achieves this transition is not made clear in 
Erikson's and Piaget's work. However, according to some theorists children develop 
self-consciousness through the use of an imaginary companion. 
Psychoanalysis provides the most comprehensive investigation of this view. The most 
recently proposed psychoanalytic theory pertaining to imaginary companions was 
proposed by Bruce Klien in 1985 and is somewhat more complex than those that came 
before. Central to his approach is the concept of splitting. Splitting involves an 
individual separating personal characteristics and behaviours which they, or society, 
consider undesirable, from their desirable and acceptable side, thus polarising rather 
than integrating aspects of their personality (Klein, 1985). 
The child with an imaginary companion generally intrajects the good side and projects 
the bad, although there are cases where the opposite happens. Thus the imaginary 
companion is the embodiment of either a positive or negative aspect of the child's 
personality. Such splitting is evident when children use their imaginary companion as a 
scapegoat, blaming any of their wrong doing on their naughty mend. Alternatively 
when the child intrajects the bad feelings and traits, they often look to their good 
companion to "straighten them out" (Klein, 1985). 
From a developmental standpoint the psychoanalysts view splitting as a developmental 
stage that precedes the major developmental task of separating self from object 
relations. This involves the child learning to differentiate between themselves and 
others, before finally integrating their good self/bad self split (Klein, 1985). 
Repression takes over the role that splitting had previously played, by repressing 
unacceptable impulses, instead of allowing them into consciousness. Klein (1985) 
explains that this transition is not an easy one and that the imaginary companion aids 
this change. He considers it as "not only normal, but also necessary for ego 
development to create the subjective/objective world where object constancy and 
narcissistic expansion are enriched" (p.281). 
Selma Fraiberg's book "The Magic Years" offers some of the most insightful 
psychoanalytic writing on this topic. Her views are more concrete than Klein's and 
tend to rely more on observed behaviour rather than mental process. Fraiberg (1959) 
highlights four important functions of the imaginary companion, and in particular the 
scapegoat. Firstly, the child tries to avoid the criticism of adults by blaming his/her 
faults on someone else - the imaginary companion. Secondly, the child avoids 
accepting this naughty/bad side as a characteristic of him/herself, thus maintaining self 
love. Thirdly, by externalising his/her negative characteristics the child is able to 
remove them out of the abstract arena of his/her mind and thus creates "an objective 
opponent with whom he can more easily do battle." ( 144 ). The battle she talks of 
involves the child who takes on the role of a parent in rebuking his/her companion for 
its naughty behaviour, however as the companion is actually an extension of 
themselves, the rebuke is thus a form of self criticism. Self criticism she explains is the 
first major step toward impulse control and the development of a conscience. Lastly, 
the imaginary companion seives to aid the integration of the child's good and bad side, 
so that the child can accept his/her bad side and take responsibility for their actions. 
From a different and perhaps unexpected quarter comes another theorist who believes 
imaginary companions aid the development of self-consciousness. The philosopher 
George Herbert Mead wrote in 1934 that all children in one form or another had an 
imaginary companion as they are essential to the development of self-consciousness. 
Self-consciousness, he said, requires reflexivity so that the child is able to be an object 
in his or her own experience. This reflexivity relies on the child's ability to be able to 
structure the various roles of others into an organised structured whole. For example 
he explains that to attempt any co-operative task the child must have an understanding 
of the role of others, their own role, and their role in relation to that of the others, so 
that the group can function effectively as a whole (1934). The child with an imaginary 
companion is calling out in themselves those responses which might be elicited in other 
people, thus using the companion to practice di:ff erentiating their roles and those of 
others. This view is similar to that of Bretherton (1989) who stated that children that 
engaged in pretence have to take on multiple roles learning a "surprisingly sophisticated 
repertoire of stage management devices" (p. l 0). 
A number of developmentalists view imaginary companions as important in healthy 
childhood development, included in this is the development of self-consciousness. 
Singer and Singer (1990) who have worked widely in this area believe that imaginary 
companions and the imagination in general can be used in the absence of peers to 
master social skills. Newson and Newson (1976) explain "in their main role as 
playmate, however, they have particular virtues of patience and amiability which can 
ease the child very gradually into the social relationships which eventually have to be 
worked out on a reality level with his less tolerant peers" (p.154-155). Manosevitz, 
Prentice and Wilson ( 1973) claim that although most children will learn such skills, 
they \"\-ill do so at a much slower rate than those who have imaginary companions. 
Supporting research indicates that children with imaginary companions are less 
competent, and may have fewer peers as only and eldest children are over represented 
among children with imaginary companions. Harter and Choa (1992) have also 
found evidence to suggest that children's imaginary companions increase a child's 
competence by one of two means, firstly by creating an "ego ideal" to which the child 
aspires, or secondly by creating an incompetent companion, which makes them feel 
superior and confident in comparison (p. 360). In this way the child not only learns 
social skills but also gains self-esteem and self confidence in that they can either enlist 
the help of their imaginary companion or can feel confident in the knowledge that at 
least they are smarter than their comparuon. This creates an atmosphere that IS 
conducive to the acquisition of cognitive skills as well. 
Developmentalists essentially view imaginary comparuons as providing a way of 
ensuring normal social development which, if not accomplished via an imaginary 
companion, would be accomplished through some other means. In contrast those that 
take an ecological viewpoint stress that imaginary companions are the result of 
environmental deficiencies and are the child's attempt to compensate for them. Unlike 
the developmental view, the ecological one is that the child utilises their imaginary 
companion to cope with unexpected hurdles in the form of environmental deficiencies 
that are not common to all children. This theory thus makes it clear why not all 
children have such companions. Such deficiencies include a lack of social interaction 
causing loneliness, a lack of affection or positive attention, and insufficient mental 
stimulation. This view proposes that imaginary companions are "healthy reactions to 
an unhealthy situation" (Bettleheim, cited Pines, 1978, p. 42), thus suggesting that by 
manipulating the child's environment the companion may be rendered unnecessary. 
This view has not received much attention, this may be due to its negative nature and 
tendency to blame the child's parents. This aside there is some supporting evidence. 
The research which attests to only and eldest children being over represented in studies 
of children with imaginary companions was earlier used to support the view that 
imaginary companions are a tool used to develop social skills. However, this may also 
be construed to mean that such children are deprived in that they have limited social 
interaction and are thus lonely. Manosevitz et al (1973) have found support for this 
interpretation as their study indicates that children with imaginary companions are 
more likely to initiate play while also participating in more activities with their families, 
than children without imaginary companions. 
One of the more obscure theories proposed has come from Julian Jaynes who wrote 
"The origins of consciousness in the breakdown of the bicameral mind.". Jaynes 
proposed in his book that the ancient Greeks did not have consciousness as we know it 
today, but instead were directed by hallucinated voices of the Gods. The bicameral 
mind is one where behaviour is governed not by conscious thought but by the direction 
of the Gods via the hallucination in the wernics region of the brain. Then, over time, 
the conscious mind took over the role of the hallucinated Gods, rendering the 
bicameral mind unused in the modem mind, bar several exceptions. 
One such exception according to Jaynes is the imaginary companion. Jaynes explains 
his theory of imaginary companions in children as "my thinking here is that by some 
innate or environmental predisposition to have imaginary companions, the neurological 
structure of the general bicameral paradigm is exercised." (1976, p.397). 'That is to 
say the child's companion is hallucinated in much the same way as the Greeks 
hallucinated their God's. 
He also claims that hypnosis engages the bicameral mind which allows for a more 
absolute control over behaviour than is possible with consciousness. On the basis of 
this claim he suggests that people that have had imaginary companion should thus be 
more susceptible to hypnosis in later life. He goes on to state that research does 
indeed indicate that those who have had imaginary companions are easier to hypnotise. 
He does not cite the research which has led to this conclusion. It is accepted by other 
researchers that there is a link between imagination and hypnosis. However as Hilgard 
(1977) explains "the role of imagination in hypnosis apparently requires some ability to 
make use of the images that are present in some special manner if imagery ability is to 
lead to hypnotisability" (p. 100). Thus, it is not enough to be effective at using the 
imagination: to be readily hypnotised the individual must also have the ability to utilise 
that skill in a certain, thus far undetermined way. 
Although somewhat obscure in nature Jaynes theory does go some way to explaining 
the mechanism which allows children to have imaginary companions. However, it 
does not address the question of what function they serve for those children that have 
them, nor does it provide an answer as to why not all children adopt imaginary 
comparuons. 
Researchers and theorists alike have overwhelmingly come to the conclusion that 
children with imaginary companions are better off for the experience (e.g. Taylor, 
Cartwright & Carlson 1993; Singer & Singer 1990; Harter & Choa 1992; and Klien 
1985). However, as stated earlier, this has not translated into positive attitudes in 
parents as indicated by the only two studies which have looked at parents attitudes. 
Manosevitz et al. (1973) conducted a study in which they questioned parents on all 
aspects of imaginary companions, only briefly touching on the subject of attitudes 
toward imaginary companions. In their study "the attitudes of the parents toward their 
child's imaginary companion were described as 'good for the child' by 62%, and as 
'having no effect' on the child by 42%, ·although 4% of the parents felt the imaginary 
companion had a 'harmful effect' on the child" (1973, p. 76). While 50% of parents 
encouraged the imaginary companion, 43% ignored it and 7% discouraged it. 
Although these results are not entirely negative the manner in which the questions were 
asked may have had some influence on parents ability to distinguish encouraging 
behaviour from discouraging behaviour. Secondly, a particular attitude does not 
necessarily translate into a corresponding behaviour. 
The other more comprehensive study on parental attitudes toward imaginary 
companions was carried out by Brooks and Knowles (1982). They set out to find 
how having an imaginary companion compared to other childhood behaviours, while 
also establishing how parents thought the issue should be approached, that is with 
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encouragement, neutrality etc. They found that in comparison to other behaviours 
imaginary companions were seen in a neutral manner. They concluded that "provision 
for constructive make-believe play in the child's life seems to be restricted by the 
attitude held most typically by the parents in our study". They go on to say that the 
reasons for this concern are "worthy of exploration"(1982, p. 32) and from this grew 
one of the major aims of the current study. 
Personal experience as a general rule tends to influence the attitudes we hold on those 
experiences, thus it may be that parents whose children have not had imaginary 
companions may well hold different views than parents that have experienced them in 
their own children. It is the aim of this study to make such a comparison not only in 
terms of attitudes but also in terms of their respective conceptualisations of the 
functions they perform, as no other study has made such an attempt. 
The research into the function of imaginary companions has tended to assume that all 
imaginary companions perform the same role in their creators lives. This assumption 
denies all evidence that would suggest that children create imaginary companions for a 
variety of reasons. Thus it is another aim of this study to establish what, if anything, 
parents feel is the function of their child's imaginary companion is. The research done 
thus far has essentially focused on one of four functions, those being, a scapegoat goat 
as described by Selma Fraiberg (1959), a teacher as proposed by Harter and Choa 
(1992), a guardian angel or protector as Singer and Singer (1990) outlined, and lastly 
as someone to look after as Harter and Choa (1992) illustrated as an alternative to a 
teacher. These four functions will all be incorporated in the study, making it a 
deductive rather than inductive approach to the question of function. 
The literature which relates to imaginary companions m regard to incidence, 
characteristics, characteristics of their creators, and parental response will be outlined 
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m the next section. The following section will address the mam aspects of 
investigation this study will Wldertake, before the outline of how it was Wldertaken is 
presented, along with the respective findings. 
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